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An analytical framework for a political economy of football 
Wyn Grant 




A political economy of football has become more essential as the game has been 
colonised by elements of the business class.   There is a tension between its profit 
maximising understanding of football and a more community oriented, democratic vision 
that seeks to pursue government policy goals.    The insights of economics and politics 
are both necessary to understand the political economy of football, but they should not be 
hybridised.    Economics allows us to understand the distinctive characteristics of the 
football market while politics permits an analysis both of the politics of cooption and 
engagement and the politics of resistance.    Four variables are identified that represent a 
political science contribution to the analysis of football and its relationship with 
government. 








An analytical framework for a political economy of football 
 
The argument made in this article is that a political economy of football is both necessary 
and possible.   Football has become more important economically and politically in 
Britain as it has assumed many of the characteristics of other big businesses, driven in 
part by its association with global media corporations.    The colonisation of football by 
elements of the business class has, however, produced tensions with those who see it as a 
community oriented, democratic activity that can achieve government policy goals such 
as social inclusion.   A political economy framework can help us to understand the 
conflicting pressures that football faces: as a business, particularly from the viewpoint of 
media companies; as a leisure activity and source of identity for fans; and as means of 
promoting social policy objectives such as healthier lifestyles and social inclusion.   
Whilst a framework of this kind cannot resolve unavoidable conflicts of values, it can 
facilitate a better understanding of the respective roles of the state and the market in 
football and hence inform policy choices.   The principal focus of this article is on the 
English Premiership because this is where the greatest controversies about the 
intersection between business, politics and sport arise, but much of the analysis applies to 
football at all levels where players are paid on a full-time basis. 
   The construction of an analytical framework for a political economy of football is a 
difficult and problematic exercise.    In part, this has to do with issues about the nature of 
political economy as an intellectual enterprise, but it also arises from particular features 
of football as a sport, business and source of identity.    Hence, bringing the two together 
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is a journey full of pitfalls.    Nevertheless, we need to work towards an analytical 
framework that situates football in its economic and political context. 
     This article is about a political economy of football rather than a political economy of 
sport and the relationship between the two is left unexplored here.   Should a political 
economy of football be a subset of a more general political economy of sport?   
Constructing a political economy of sport would be an even more ambitious effort and 
would require knowledge about a range of sports that the writer does not possess.   There 
is case, however, for looking at football on its own.  ‘Association football … is without 
question the world’s most popular sport … Some estimates value soccer-related business 
at over £250 billion in the year 2003.’  (Guilianotti, 2005, 19). 
    This article does not deal systematically with questions of identity in relation to 
football, except in so far as they are necessary to an understanding of the economic 
dynamics of the sport.    This is not to deny the importance of such cultural 
understandings of football or of the more general contribution made by the sociology of 
sport.  (Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002).    Indeed, Conn (2005) argues ‘As other collective 
institutions disappear, football clubs are becoming an increasingly central part of people’s 
identity.’   These considerations are important, but to explore them systematically would 
be to overload the article which confines its ambitions to the insights offered by two 
disciplines, economics and political science.   The economic analysis of football has been 
well developed and ‘Papers on the economics of sport now appear regularly in many of 
the leading economics journals’.   (Dobson and Goddard, 2001, 19).   Political science 
analysis of football is less well developed than that available in either economics or 
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sociology and can drawn on contemporary debates such as those relating to policy 
communities, depoliticisation and the regulatory state. 
    This article identifies with those analysts such as Phillips who want to revert to a more 
classical understanding of political economy and remove the ‘I’ from international 
political economy and the ‘C’ from comparative political economy.    Thus, ‘the 
attachment of the “C” and the “I” to a term that already by definition encompasses both of 
these is, in the first place, unnecessary and, in the second, counterproductive in that it has 
occasioned an unhelpful disciplinary fragmentation and a range of unhappy consequences 
for the theoretical and empirical study of contemporary political economy.’  (Phillips, 
2004, 265).  Football is an activity that is organised at an international, regional, national 
(and, of course, local) level.   It therefore needs the insights about globalisation and its 
effects generated within the international political economy paradigm, but also the 
sensitivity to national differences arising from debates about varieties of capitalism, as 
well as an understanding of the increasing significance of regional actors, particularly the 
European Union (EU).   ‘A dominant theme’ that emerges from one analysis of the 
political economy of sport ‘is the accelerated expansion of transnational capitalism and 
its extension into the sport/cultural realm.’   (Schimmel, 2005, 3).    However, the 
expansion of capitalist values into football has met with a politics of resistance, not least 
from community based movements mobilising to defend their club.    Such movements 
have been able to draw on fans’ identification with their club which is all the stronger for 
the fact that it in terms of geography it is often sentimental and constructed.   Whether 
such movements are effective is an issue that is returned to later. 
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     It is also worth noting that the world of football constitutes a clearly defined policy 
community with clear boundaries, underpinned by its own rituals and technical expertise, 
with a high political entry price.   Measured against the advance of the regulatory state 
(Moran, 2005), it has continued to enjoy considerable autonomy in its governance 
arrangements, despite a series of evident failures.   ‘Historically, sport in Britain was a 
quintessential example of an activity regulated autonomously in the sphere of civil 
society.  In recent decades, its economic significance has grown greatly and at the same 
time it has been drawn ever closer into the state’s sphere of influence.’  (Moran, 2005, 
73).     Nevertheless, government has, however, been largely content to let the Football 
Association (FA) put its own house in order, as is evidenced by the failure of plans for an 
independent regulator.  (Bower, 2003). This is all the more remarkable when one 
considers that football generally lacks sophistication when it comes to political questions.   
Many clubs were slow to appreciate just what the EU could do with its competition 
policy powers and it was really the giant clubs that were able to appreciate the 
seriousness of the situation and respond accordingly.   In other words, a ‘company state’ 
model prevailed over the ‘associative state’ model represented by Uefa.  Many clubs, 
however, continue to resent the intervention of the EU through the application of general 
competition laws to their special sector.   As one Premiership chairman put it: 
      The European Commission continues to involve itself in the affairs of the FA 
      Premier League in a very public and high profile manner.  …. It cannot be right that 
      the Commission should seek to challenge our right to enter into genuine commercial 
      agreements for the sale of our broadcast rights because they do not like the outcome. 
      We must use every means at our disposal to protect the game in this country from  
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      such outside interference.   (Murray, 2005, 5). 
As far as the European Commission is concerned, football as a multi-billon euro business 
activity cannot be exempted from the competition rules designed to deal with abuses of 
economic power through monopolies and cartels, although the deal reached on the FA 
Premier League’s television rights, after much talk of a crackdown, represents a very 
good outcome for the Premiership. 
    In summary, we have what has been a highly insulated sector of economy and society 
being buffeted by forces that it does not always fully comprehend, let alone be able to 
effectively control.  The lack of sophistication means that although politics undoubtedly 
matters in football, it matters in a particular way.   The political is perceived as a largely 
malign force external to a policy community that should be allowed to regulate its own 
affairs.   This makes exogenously driven political change quite difficult.   It is also means 
that the discourse of depoliticisation that has been applied so effectively to the 
understanding of much of contemporary economic policy cannot be deployed so readily 
in the case of football.   In a sense, it has to be politicised before it can depoliticised. 
The integration of economic and political analysis 
This article aspires to start to move towards ‘a political economy that privileges neither 
politicism nor economism’.  (Phillips, 2005a, 251).   Contrary to the liberal view that one 
has to make a separation between state and market and their study, it is contended that 
‘politics and economics are intrinsically inseparable, and that this inseparability must be 
represented in the primary theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of 
IPE.’   (Phillips, 2005a, 250).   The challenge is then to decide what constitutes ‘an 
appropriate integration of … politics and economics’.  (Phillips, 2005a, 250).     Such an 
 7 
attempt at integration does not, however, need to entail: ‘a hybridization of the two 
subjects which would inevitably mean that the economics strain would be dominant.’   
(Grant, 1982, 3).  A multi-disciplinary approach has to precede an interdisciplinary one.    
By combining the insights of the two disciplines, one can better understand the specific 
problem and also facilitate a dialogue between them. 
     Hence, this analysis does proceed through a separate examination of economic and 
political forces and is therefore open to the criticism that by looking at political reactions 
to economic forces, it is privileging the economic over the political.    It is argued that we 
do not yet have an adequate analytical framework that allows us to combine economic 
and political insights in a way that respects the contribution of each discipline.   It also 
has to be recognised that economic forces represented by big business are strong and that 
the role of politics is to contain and regulate them, even given that there are limits to state 
action.  (Burnham, 2006). 
The contribution and limits of economics 
Two polar views need to be rejected if we are to proceed successfully.   One is the view 
taken by some economists that there is an economic explanation of everything: 
        Morality, it could be argued, represents the way that people would like the world 
        to work – whereas economics represents how it actually does work.  … 
        [Economics] comprises an extraordinarily powerful and flexible set of tools 
        that can reliably assess a thicket of information to determine the effect of any one 
        factor, or even the whole effect.  (Levitt and Dubner, 2005, 13). 
Economic explanations do have wide applications and the fact that rationality is bounded 
does not necessarily undermine them.   The unease expressed here is a normative rather 
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than an analytical one.   Making economic explanations predominate can encourage a 
process of commodification and it could be argued that sport should be added to 
Polanyi’s list of land, labour and money as entities that should not be treated as 
commodities.   (Polanyi, 1957, 72-3).   The methodological individualism of economics 
can lead to an understatement of the value of collective structures in a society that bind it 
together, its social capital, with sports clubs being one specific example.   ‘Economic 
liberalism is in this sense a victim of its own propaganda: offered to all, it has evoked 
pressures and demands that cannot be contained.’  (Hirsch, 1977, 70).    
    One therefore needs to be aware of the limits of economics and the dangers of its 
seductive embrace.   However, one also needs to reject the opposite view, represented for 
example by Susan Strange, which amounts to ‘always attack the economists’.   Strange 
had a number of objections to economists and to liberal economists in particular, issuing 
a clarion call to students of international political economy to throw off ‘the intellectual 
bondage of liberal economics’.  (Strange, 2002a, 47).   One of her central objections, not 
an unfamiliar charge to be levelled against economists, was: 
       [M]ost economists tacitly share certain fundamental assumptions about the 
       rationality of buyers and sellers in the marketplace, or about the easy  
       availability of information regarding supply and demand that happen to be 
       convenient for economic argument but which do not always accord with everyday 
       experience.  (Strange, 2002b, 121). 
Information asymmetries are in fact a central feature of discussions of market failure in 
economics, but her more central objection appears to be that economists engage in model 
building.   In other words, they make simplifying assumptions that allow them to generate 
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robust models that have explanatory and/or predictive value, even if they are an 
approximate fit to the whole range of experience.   
      Perhaps her real objection is ‘the study of economics is led and dominated by the 
United States’ (Strange, 2002c,190), although the same observation could be made of 
political science and international relations, not that it prevents the development of 
distinctive British theoretical and empirical perspectives.   There is, however, perhaps 
something in her observation that economics exhibits ‘a certain political naiveté in its 
conclusions.’  (Strange, 2002c, 190).  Economics tends to regard the choice of policy 
instruments as a second order question, whereas for a student of public policy they are of 
central importance and linked to broader theoretical debates such as that about the 
regulatory state. 
     The broad position adopted here is that economic explanations can take us so far and 
indeed cannot be avoided.   However, whilst they are necessary, they are never sufficient.   
Other forms of explanation are needed, but not simply as supplements to compensate for 
any deficiencies in the main analytical dish.   The approach adopted is first to take some 
central economic concepts and apply them to the case of football.   One of the findings to 
emerge is that football as a ‘market’ has some very distinctive characteristics.   The 
limitations of an economic analysis are illustrated through a discussion of whether fans 
should be designated as ‘customers’ or supporters.    Having seen how far economic 
analysis can take us, particularly in terms of bringing out the distinctiveness of football, 
we then consider how a political analysis can be brought into the discussion. 
     Before proceeding to an economic analysis of football, let us briefly consider in 
stylised terms the ways in which it has changed as an economic sector in recent years.      
 10 
In the 1990s the nature of football as an enterprise changed with clubs becoming more 
like other businesses in the way that they were run.    A number of leading clubs such as 
Aston Villa, Manchester United and Tottenham Hotspur were floated on stock 
exchanges, often realising considerable profits for the existing shareholders.   As Carter 
summarises the position (2006, 123): 
        By the late 1990s, it had become a cliché to say that football had become a business, 
        but it was true nonetheless.   With little regulation, the game was almost an 
        exemplary model of capitalism, and at the top of football’s pyramid, a 
        ‘consolidation’ process emerged with a small number of clubs dominating the 
        market. 
       Although not attracting the attendances of baseball, American football, or basketball, 
football (or soccer) was successfully introduced into the key US market.     Revenue 
streams in Europe increased considerably as television revenues grew rapidly with the 
advent of satellite and cable television, higher ticket prices, more effective marketing of 
merchandise and more lucrative corporate sponsorship.   Football’s profitability became 
interlocked with that of the media industry and associated with this was a closer 
intersection between football and the cult of celebrity.  Clubs like Manchester United 
developed into global brands.   The fan, however, had to pay more to watch the game and 
more to wear the official choice of team shirt.   Fans were able to buy shares in their own 
clubs, but these gave only the illusion of ownership as Manchester United fans found 
when their shareholdings were unable to halt the takeover of the club by the Glazer 
family. 
An economic analysis of football 
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A common proposition about football is that it is a very unusual market because of the 
intense loyalty of customers to a particular brand.   Because of their loyalty to their club, 
fans are open to exploitation, indeed among fans that is almost a shared definition of what 
they are.   They have to put up with very high prices, club merchandise with high price 
marks ups, inconvenient kick off times and indifferent and over priced food sold in 
stadiums because the option of exit is not a feasible one.   The disgruntled fan has a 
number of options available: stop attending at all; start supporting another club; or watch 
another sport.   Loyalty is an obstacle to the second option and, in any case, other clubs 
may charge just as much.    If one starts watching a non-league club, the standard of play 
and facilities will be inferior.   Switching to another sport is an unlikely option.   To put it 
in technical language, both for other teams and other sports, the cross-price elasticity of 
demand is ‘near zero.’  (Sandy, Sloan and Rosentraub, 2004, 7). 
     The simple exit option is the most likely, but is often taken for reasons such as 
changes in family or working circumstances.   It also has to be remembered that going to 
a football match is as much a social event as a sporting experience.   Season ticket 
holders can enjoy the company of the same group of people year after year, and even if 
they don’t like some of them very much, that can be part of the experience.   The 
judgements of the ‘Bloke Behind Me’ can be a source of enjoyment because they are 
humorous, whether intentionally or because they are so ridiculous.   Visiting the pub 
before and after the game also serves as a social focus for renewing and making 
friendships.   For many fans, attending the match is a way of keeping in contact with old 
friends or a cherished set of locations (including, of course, the ground itself) they would 
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not otherwise visit.   Sentiment and habit can be powerful forces in maintaining patterns 
of behaviour. 
     It might then seem that partisanship and brand loyalty makes football a very special 
market.   However, a note of caution is necessary.   The price elasticity of demand for 
tickets is actually quite difficult to calculate.   In practice, however, ticket prices are 
increasingly varied (although in general not as much as they should be) to take account of 
differential demand for different games.    Clubs should perhaps take more account of the 
benefits derived from ancillary sales in setting prices and also the contribution that fans 
make to the atmosphere of a televised game.    What is striking is that English football 
supporters can pay four times as much as their counterparts in other top leagues to watch 
matches.    Even taking the cheapest season ticket, it can cost over three times as much to 
watch football at Arsenal or Chelsea as the most expensive club elsewhere (Barcelona). 
(www.footballeconomy.com, 26 August 2004). 
     More generally, it is possible to over estimate both the unlikelihood of the exit option 
and the partisan loyalty of fans.   It should be recalled that ‘between the late 1940s and 
the late 1980s, football lost over half its spectators.’  (Szymanski and Kuypers, 2000, 46).   
The missing fans were replaced by a more family oriented fan base as the hooliganism 
problem, at least in grounds, was tackled by new technology and stadiums were 
modernised and made more comfortable.   However, these new fans may be more fickle 
and there is anecdotal evidence that the fan base is ageing at the older clubs because of 
pricing policies.  (Conn, 2004, 11).   Perhaps too readily and understandably the image of 
the fan is often constructed around a single male who is obsessive about his football club 
and whose whole life is built around it.   There is a greater danger of reifying the male 
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long-standing supporter who is then presented as the noble fan.   Football supporters are 
actually a more diverse group.    
     Fans can be more fickle than is sometime assumed.   Fans like to assert that they have 
always followed one club through thick and thin and may develop a familiarity with 
famous events in the club’s history so that they can claim that they were there at those 
vital moments.   It should be noted that ‘beyond the hard core there are many supporters 
who are willing to switch allegiance towards more successful teams.’  (Szymanski and 
Kuypers, 2000, 190).     Relatively stable aggregate attendance figures conceal a great 
deal of churn in their actual composition and the new fans could be expected to be less 
loyal than those who have been fans for many years (indeed, they may be stigmatised as 
‘glory hunters’ by more established fans).   Football and partisanship may seem to be 
inseparable, but there are those who are interested in technical exhibitions of skill.   
Nevertheless, brand loyalty is exceptionally high in football, particularly compared to 
other product markets, and this does constrain the use of the exit option and create a 
relatively inelastic pattern of demand.    However, one must be careful of overstating this 
effect, particularly against a background of growing fan dissatisfaction with high player 
wages and the prices they are required to pay for enjoying football in England 
    It has been argued that in Europe ‘there are too many clubs given the overall 
population.’(Sandy, Sloan and Rosentraub, 2004, 22-23).   In terms of revenue 
generation, this problem is compounded by the fact that teams are not granted exclusive 
territorial franchises on the American model that create a local monopoly, so there may 
be a large number of clubs in a single metropolitan area, e.g., Manchester and the 
surrounding towns).   An entrepreneur wishing to establish a new club without proximate 
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competition is going to have a limited choice of locations.  The only populated area of 
any size in England where there are no clubs is Cornwall, which has a strong rugby 
tradition (fans in eastern Cornwall can support Plymouth). 
     Why, then, do so few league clubs go out of business?    The relatively few examples 
are ingrained on the collective consciousness of fans: Accrington Stanley, Maidstone 
United, Newport County, Third Lanark etc. and three of the examples cited have re-
formed, albeit at lower levels of competition.   The last club to exit the Football League 
was Aldershot in 1992.  A third of all Football League teams have gone into 
administration since 2000 ‘but not one of these clubs has been wound-up and ceased 
operating.’   (Emery and Weed, 2006, 5).   Every so often a club is reported to be on the 
brink of closure, the latest example being Rotherham, but usually someone is found to 
stage a rescue package.   The more general point here is that the assumption of profit 
maximisation is not necessarily a reasonable one for football clubs.  Indeed, ‘it may be 
sensible to view the objective of the football club as one of utility maximisation subject 
to a financial solvency constraint.’   (Dobson and Goddard, 2001, 8).   This does not, 
however, apply to the media organisations that are increasingly shaping the game at the 
higher levels. 
     Because the existence of the club is so important to the identity of many fans, they 
will dig deep in their pockets to keep the club going, with fans living abroad who have 
not been near the club for years among the most generous donors.   Even people who are 
not fans of the club may be persuaded to donate.   Moreover, administration is a useful 
reorganising device with the St. John’s Ambulance and local businesses invariably not 
getting their outstanding bills paid.    Once the club is in administration, a wealthy 
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business person may arrive on the scene to acquire it at a knock down price, although not 
necessarily as a good business proposition (which it often is not unless there is unrealised 
property value).    Indeed, ‘the owners of clubs are frequently wealthy fans who may treat 
their team not as a business but rather as a consumption activity from which they derive 
utility.’  (Sandy, Sloan and Rosentraub, 2004, 11). 
      Paradoxically, in conventional markets, ‘it is often the more efficient firms [that] exit, 
leaving the less efficient firms behind.’  (Grant, 1989, 25).    It is a phenomenon, for 
example, which has been observed recently among dairy farmers.   Larger scale, more 
efficient farmers are more willing and more able to exploit alternative uses for their 
capital assets, whilst satisficers are willing to continue to get by on suboptimal profits 
because they cannot think of, or are unwilling to pursue, alternatives.  The resistance to 
exit in football markets may not necessarily be undesirable.    There is a clear clash 
between a market rationale which may suggest that there should be fewer teams which 
would, in principle, lead to a higher revenue stream for those remaining and the view 
generally held by fans that all clubs in existence should be allowed to survive.   Mergers 
are a conventional reorganisation device in most markets, but are relatively rare in 
football.    Inverness Caledonian Thistle, which brought together the town’s Thistle and 
Caledonian clubs, is the only recent successful example.  One problem is that most 
mergers are in fact ‘takeovers’ where either the identity of one company is subsumed in 
another or where distinct brand identities are preserved after the merger, an option not 
feasible in football given strict rules on dual ownership and ‘nursery clubs’ (although 
there might be a case for relaxing the latter to help struggling lower division teams).    
Even the apparently more innocuous option of ground sharing can attract strong fan 
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objections because of the extent to which their identity is bound up with the stadium. 
Thus, as far as the number of enterprises in the football market is concerned, or even the 
facilities they use, community oriented values win out over the logic of the market.   
    Football, like other sports, ‘differs from other businesses because it requires joint 
production.’  (Sandy, Sloane and Rosentraub, 2004, 157).   Teams need other teams to 
compete against and a league offers a more structured and interesting format for such 
competition which is why they were formed in the first place.   However, a league can be 
constituted in a number of different ways, size and hence frequency of matches between 
its members being one variable, while relegation and promotion rules are another.  Above 
all, a key issue is whether the league is structured in such a way as to promote uncertainty 
of outcome, both in particular matches and across the season as a whole.    There are a 
number of devices for making leagues more competitive ranging from sharing attendance 
money with away teams to player drafts.    The rationale for seeking to enhance 
unpredictability is to maximise entertainment value for the fans. 
     ‘The most significant issue that now confronts all leagues in North America and the 
UK is competitive balance.’   (Sandy, Sloan and Rosentraub, 2004, 177).   Owners have 
an interest in winning as many games as possible so maximise revenue, given that 
success attracts crowds and television revenue.   Hence, ‘The real issue may well be the 
inherent conflict between owners’ self-interest and a league’s self-interest.’   (ibid., 181).   
The Premiership was formed by top clubs because they wanted a bigger slice of the 
available revenue, particularly television revenue which they wanted and were able to 
increase.   They also wanted a bigger say in how the game was run.   They succeeded in 
these objectives, but at the price of creating a league which can effectively only be won a 
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very limited number of clubs.   However, ‘there is no empirical evidence to suggest that 
leagues are far worse off when one or two clubs dominate.’   (ibid., p. 183).   Mid or 
lower table clubs still get bumper attendances when they play one of the top clubs, even 
though the outcome is relatively predictable.   It is in this area of league structure that 
business values have most clearly won out, with an increasing role for foreign investors 
even in less glamorous clubs.    Market forces and big business interests have clearly 
prevailed, although some fans have taken the exit with voice option, e.g., the formation of 
FC United by dissident Manchester United supporters. 
    What is evident from this discussion is that football is a very special sector of the 
economy to which some of the rules of the market do not apply in a usual way.   Brand 
loyalty is strong, although sometimes overstated, and demand is usually highly inelastic 
(particularly for season tickets), creating an environment in which football supporters are 
open to exploitation with substantial transfers of funds taking place to players and their 
agents and occasionally owners.   The football market is, however, highly stable in terms 
of participants with exit (and entry) occurring rarely so that fans are usually able to 
continue to follow their chosen club, although the transformation of Wimbledon into 
Milton Keynes Dons opens the possibility of clubs being treated as franchises.    The 
balance of power between top clubs and the league has, however, shifted in a context in 
which football has become vitally important for building and retaining television 
audiences.    It is in this respect that the predominance of the logic of the market is most 
evident. 
The politics of product and consumption 
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Just as, following Hirschman (1970), ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ may be used as metaphors for 
economics and politics respectively, football fans can alternatively be constructed as 
‘consumers’ (a more liberal economics perspective) or ‘supporters’ (a more community 
oriented political perspective).  Conceptually, the role of the fan as consumer could be 
seen as a link between economic and political accounts.  Because exit is a difficult 
psychological choice for a fan, Horton (1997, 111) sees the language of the customer or 
consumer as inappropriate, arguing ‘Customers make choices, supporters do not.’   The 
very idea of being a supporter may be in jeopardy if the fan defines himself or herself as a 
consumer so that football becomes ‘a financial transaction between a seller and a buyer.’  
(Horton, 1997, 112).   The best service is then given to the person who pays the most, and 
even that person is in a relatively weak position compared to institutional shareholders 
and sponsors.   Horton argues (1997, 113), ‘We should talk the language of the 
entitlement, not of the customer.’ 
     The perception of many supporters is that ‘There is a distance between football and its 
supporters which is … getting wider … Football has marginalised the supporters.’  
(Horton, 1997, 183).   Some fans, however, see the way forward in being treated as a 
customer rather than a supporter, as the following extracts from a discussion on a football 
E mail list demonstrate.    Two supporters take the liberal view that the market itself was 
empowering: 
      What’s wrong with being treated like a customer?  Customers get asked their wants  
      and needs and companies do their damndest to give them what they really want at a 
      fair price, for fear they stop buying.  That’s what we want, isn’t it? 
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      Another contributor argued that the problem over the years is that customers had been 
treated as supporters which had been seen as a category of subordination: 
      A business generally can’t be successful unless it has delivered a certain degree of 
      customer satisfaction, and therefore by definition has to ‘work with’ its customers  
      through market research in order to deliver the product/service they are willing to 
      [continue] to buy … the sensible clubs are those who retain and build loyalty by 
      understanding the wants and needs of those who align themselves with their ‘brand’ 
      An alternative view was: 
      Customers and fans are very different and in my eyes if you are treated like a 
      customer then basically the business concerned is out for itself and any attempt to 
      treat customers well is only ‘because it means more profit’.   Profit is the be all and 
      end all!   There lies a lot of problems with football. 
      It could be that the genie of market forces is out of the bottle in football and cannot be 
put back in again.   Moran has noted (2003, 88), ‘the increasing colonization of sport by 
the market.  This has commonly involved much more than merely selling the activity.  It 
has transformed the way it is organized and even played.’   However, one should not slip 
too readily into a deterministic version of the advance of neo-liberalism in which market 
forces sweep all before them.    There is a literature which argues that the status of 
consumer can be politically empowering.   Citizen consumers ‘use exit, voice, and loyalty 
consumer choice alternatives to express themselves politically at the marketplace.’  
(Micheletti, 2003, 19).   Thus, ‘Consumption can in certain instances be a venue for 
political action.   It offers people an inroad – venue – into policymaking that otherwise 
may be closed to grassroots political participation.’   (Micheletti, 2003, 12).    
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      Political consumption can thus be presented as a means of overcoming political 
exclusion and placing new issues on the political agenda.    In the British context, this has 
been developed into an analysis of a new politics of retail governance in which retailers 
act as more stringent and effective regulators than the state.    Retail governance is in fact 
problematic in a number of respects, but particular problems arise in extending the 
analysis to the particular case of football.    More generally, a definition of political 
economy has been offered as the way ‘public policy and the mass consumption economy 
reinforce each other’.  (Cohen, 2004, 8).   Whilst recognising the forces that lie behind 
this definition and give it its rationale, it will not be used here. 
       ‘This view of consumption and consumer choice suggests that there is a politics of 
product, which means that every product is embedded in a political context.’   
(Micheletti, 2003, 12).     The problem is that the political economy of football is not 
conducive to an effective politics of consumerism.  The basic problem is the strong 
loyalty of the fan to the ‘brand’, making the exit with loyalty option not particularly 
viable.   A decline in Premiership attendances early in the 2005-6 season did lead to 
something of a media panic and prompted the FA Premier League to set up an 
Attendances Working Party.    Nevertheless, ‘top flight attendances have held up well, 
and are consistent with those in previous seasons.’  (Jones, 2006, 2).  ‘Average 
attendances have risen from 21,159 during the first year of the Premiership to 33,887 in 
2005/06, a growth of 60%’ and in the Football League ‘the trend line over recent years is 
upwards.’  (Deloitte, 2006, 3).    Even so, as a fan contributing to the E mail discussion 
referred to earlier noted, ‘Football should never be equated to a regular product based 
industry as the football supporter is a very unique type of “customer”’.  Self-definition as 
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a customer offers the promise of autonomy and the potential of leverage, but can 
facilitate sophisticated forms of manipulation. 
Political responses: the meta politics of club and country 
Compared with an extensive literature on the economics of sport and football, the 
literature on its politics is more limited.    This is one reason why the economic 
discussion of these questions in this article could be seen as having been privileged.  
There is first a meta politics which operates at a global, but more specifically at a 
European level which is where the richest clubs are to be found.  Much of the debate here 
has centred about debates about the interpretation and implementation of EU competition 
policy, but at the heart of these disputes is a power struggle between Fifa/Uefa 
representing an associative approach to the regulation of football and the G-14 (now with 
more than fourteen members) representing Europe’s richest clubs (although not Chelsea).   
The G-14 can be seen as broadly representative of a more market oriented approach to 
football while Fifa likes to portray itself as the defender of the world’s poorer countries 
and of community values.   Some of these battles are fought out on the courts, while 
others require winning the support of EU politicians. 
       One area of conflict between Fifa/Uefa and G-14 is over the release of players for 
international matches.   The big clubs argue that they should be compensated for the 
absence of key players and more particularly when they are injured.   A court case is over 
a Moroccan player, Abdelmajid Oulmers, who was injured in an international match after 
his club, Royal Charleroi of Belgium, was required to release him has been referred to the 
European Court of Justice.    Another issue is an attempt by Uefa to impose minimum 
quotas of home grown (strictly speaking, ‘locally trained’) players on clubs which would 
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reverse the ceiling on the number of foreign players removed by the Bosman ruling.   The 
Uefa view is that cosmopolitan squads could weaken bonds with local communities, 
whereas the clubs want the combination of players that is most likely to win matches and 
attract crowds because they include what are in effect football celebrities.   Another issue 
which was prominent a few years ago which would have a radical impact on European 
football was the formation of a European football league which would be the primary 
competition in which top clubs would participate, although there would presumably be 
some form of truncated domestic qualifying competition.   That has disappeared from the 
agenda for now, but it could be revived.    
      More generally, G-14 wants more involvement of clubs in the management of the 
international game.   They have been politically skilled in their handling of EU decision-
makers, who admittedly have a propensity to deal direct with big firms.   They have made 
use of the mechanism of the European social dialogue to hold wide-ranging talks with 
Fifpro, the players’ organisation.  Uefa, by contrast, has been relatively flat footed in 
some of its attempts to operate at an EU level, although more recently it has been 
concentrating some of its efforts on the five leading member states.  However, this is a 
contest that is by no means over with the result far from clear 
The national level: a politics of cooption and engagement 
Government intervention is not absent in football, otherwise there would not be a 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport.   Many of the interventions have, however, 
arisen from football becoming engaged with other policy arenas, most notably public 
order policies having to engage with and respond to football-related disorder and health 
and safety policies (all seater stadia in the top two divisions).   However, even in the case 
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of disorder, Mrs Thatcher’s proposal for ID cards was never implemented.   There have 
also been some important state absences compared with other countries, notably ‘the 
greater level of public subsidy generally available for stadium construction and 
maintenance on the continent than in England.’   (Dobson and Goddard, 2001, 38). 
     The most notable intervention in the economics of the game was the decision of 
Stephen Byers, then Trade Secretary, to endorse the recommendations of the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission that the BSkyB takeover of Manchester United should be 
blocked.  ‘Politicians were evidently nervous about being seen to sanction the notion that 
football clubs are merely tradeable commodities, to be bought and sold according to the 
dictates of the free market.’  (Dobson and Goddard, 2001, 85).   In opposition New 
Labour developed a commitment ‘to imposing an independent regulator on football.’  
(Bower, 2003, 137).   However, facing resistance from the leading clubs and the FA, the 
Football Task Force appointed by New Labour lost its high level support in a government 
committed to maintaining good relationships with business.    It became ‘evident that the 
government had little interest in imposing a regulator against the football authorities’ 
wishes.’   (Brown, 2000, 258).   By 2002 it was possible for FA officials to assert, 
without fear of political contradiction, that ‘We, the FA, are the regulator.’   (Quoted in 
Bower, 2003, 4). 
      Government intervention in football has thus been sporadic and has tended to 
disappear once the initiating crisis has faded from the headlines.   It is therefore important 
to examine what happens at the club, level both in terms of the management of the clubs 
and the fans.  In examining national (and indeed local) football politics, a distinction is 
made here between a politics of cooption and engagement and a politics of resistance.   
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The former is a politics developed by particular clubs as a corporate strategy, while the 
latter involves actions by fans in defence of their vision of how football should be run. 
     Charlton Athletic is taken here as an example of the politics of cooption and 
engagement, describing itself as ‘more than just a football club.’   As Banks notes (2002, 
192), ‘The pioneers of supporter activism were undoubtedly the supporters of Charlton 
Athletic.’   Cooption refers to strategies to involve fans in the agenda of the club, while 
engagement refers to efforts to relate to contemporary government policy agendas.  
Cooption in the case of Charlton is exemplified by the device of a supporters’ director 
elected by season ticket holders, although after a process of screening candidates.  
However, a supporters’ director is only one voice on the board and is subject to the 
constraints of commercial confidentiality.   At best, they can act as an ombudsperson for 
fans, and could be seen by management as a way of conveying their perspective on issues 
to supporters. 
      Charlton Athletic has followed what amounts to a conscious strategy of engagement 
with New Labour policies, although the club would no doubt prefer to describe them as 
government policies.  New Labour pursued ‘a desire to use mass sport as an instrument of 
social policy, notably as a way of combating social exclusion and promoting public 
health.’  (Moran, 2003, 89).   It is no accident that the phrase ‘social inclusion’ appears 
four times in the club’s latest annual report, along with other buzz phrases such as 
‘sustainable’ and ‘successful outputs’.  (Charlton Athletic, 2005, 17-19). The club has 
pursued a multi-level governance strategy at local, regional and national political levels.   
Activities such as providing football training for children in the school holidays are 
perceived as ‘an innovative way of meeting the Government’s social objectives and the 
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new Respect Policy.’  (Charlton Athletic, 2005, 14).   For its part the government has sent 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the then Health Secretary ‘and a delegation from the 
Home Office to discuss how football and sport can improve community cohesion and 
lead to a healthier and safer environment.’  (Charlton Athletic, 2005, 17).   Add in a 
delegation from the Belgian Government and Prince William and the club can claim: 
        Such heavyweight and high profile visits have positioned the club and the  
        Community Trust as a highly imaginative pathfinder contribution that can be used 
        as an excellent model of best corporate social responsibility practice to roll out on a 
        much wider scale in the future.   (Charlton Athletic, 2005, 13-14). 
The politics of resistance 
Supporters have attempted to develop a politics of resistance to events affecting their 
clubs which they consider to be harmful to their future.    One of the earliest and most 
successful attempts was the formation of the Valley Party by Charlton Athletic fans who 
contested local elections after the local council failed to grant them planning permission 
to return to their ground.    After a sophisticated campaign, they gained nearly 15,000 
votes and contributed to the unseating of the chair of the planning committee.  Planning 
permission was subsequently granted.  (Everitt, 1991).     This example has been followed 
by other fans, most recently the registration of a Seagulls Party with the Electoral 
Commission by Brighton and Hove Albion fans seeking to overcome local authority 
opposition to the building of their new stadium. 
    The Monopolies and Mergers Commission decided in 1999 to block the acquisition of 
Manchester United by BSKyB, a decision that ‘surprised many commentators.’ 
(Crowther, 2000, 64).   A group of  Manchester United shareholders and fans known as 
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Shareholders United Against Murdoch (SUAM) mounted a substantial campaign against 
the takeover.   Many ‘did not take SUAM seriously and thought that they were pushing a 
very large boulder up a very steep hill.’   (Crowther, 2000, 70).   In opposition and in its 
first term in office, New Labour had expressed some sympathy for the position of 
football fans.  ‘New Labour’s “Charter for Football”, Blair pledged, would allow the 
voice of ordinary supporters to be heard in the clubs.  Market forces would not be 
allowed exclusive control of football’s fate.’   (Bower, 2003, 147).   This symbolic 
commitment was exemplified by the establishment of the ultimately ineffectual Football 
Task Force.    Such ideas as an independent football regulator have disappeared off the 
agenda and New Labour has reverted to the traditional government policy of nudging the 
FA to put its own house in order.    However, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
decision may have been made in a broader political context that considered that fans were 
an important political constituency whose views should be taken into account.   The 
decision was significant because it prevented what could have been a more general trend 
for football clubs to become subsidiaries of media companies, creating a range of 
inherent conflicts of interest and greater pressure for ‘super leagues’. 
      United fans built up a block of shares in an effort to block any further takeover, but 
they were unable to prevent the acquisition of the club by the Glazers who were prepared 
to incur heavy levels of debt to purchase what they saw as a promising sporting franchise. 
The majority of shareholders saw their stake in United principally as a business 
transaction and were prepared to accept a good offer for their shares.   Some disgruntled 
United fans went off and formed a non-league team, FC United, copying an initiative by 
Wimbledon fans when their club was permitted to move to Milton Keynes as MK Dons. 
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The Wimbledon decision was particularly worrying to fans because, although the football 
authorities argued that it was a special case, it did suggest that football clubs could be 
treated as franchises that could be relocated on the American model.   FC United and 
AFC Wimbledon have done well in terms of results and attendances, and one should not 
under estimate the enthusiasm and commitment of those who are involved.   However, it 
could be argued that that they are morale building symbolic gestures of defiance in the 
face of defeat by commercial forces. 
      The supporters’ trust format for involving fans in the ownership and management of a 
football club has won official endorsement.   It was pioneered at Northampton in 1992 
where the Trust acquired seven per cent of the shares and the local authority leased out a 
new stadium.  (Lomax, 2000).    Lomax suggests, however, that it is important that trusts 
remain independent of the club: 
      This, it appears to me, is the snag with the otherwise highly successful example of 
      AFC Bournemouth, where a Trust, initiated by key supporters but comprising a 
      coalition of local supporters, acquired the football club three years ago.   When the 
      honeymoon period ends, as inevitably one day it will, whom will the supporters 
      criticize?   Themselves?   And who will be in a position to represent them in doing 
      so?  (Lomax, 2000, 86-7). 
      When Bournemouth became the first community-owned club in 1997, it was believed 
that the scheme would serve as a blueprint for others in the lower divisions, concentrating 
on raising money through areas outside football.    Money raised secured the loans for 
building the stadium, but with unpaid construction debts, the collapse of the ITV Digital 
deal, and the bottom falling out of the transfer market, the club owed the Inland Revenue 
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about £500,000 with a total debt of around £7 million and faced administration in the 
closing months of 2005.   The complicated ownership arrangements at the club did not 
make a resolution of the problems easy, with the 2,500 fans in the trust owning a 
blocking golden share that constituted 51 per cent of the voting rights.   In December 
2005 the club sold the ground for a property developer for £3.5m, wiping out half their 
debt.  They will now have to lease the ground back for around £300,000 a year. 
    Supporters’ trusts have been able to find supporters with relevant business skills 
including solicitors and accountants and individuals with marketing expertise, but they 
cannot escape the economic forces faced by all lower division clubs: small gates; limited 
commercial, television and merchandise income; unsustainable wages; and a fall in 
income from transfer fees.   The inevitable result is recurring financial crises.  One 
solution would be to make greater use of part-time players, but the Conference and even 
some non-league clubs below that level have been converting to full-time squads which 
do make a considerable difference in terms of fitness levels and performance.   
Supporters’ trusts may represent the embodiment of a community vision of football, but 
they have to operate within the logic of the market. 
     A vigorous politics of resistance has been developed within football, but it has 
enjoyed mixed success.   Probably to be more successful it would require more 
systematic backing by government, but this seems unlikely, given that while there is a 
willingness to upbraid the football authorities about particular issues (e.g., winter 
postponements) this does not extend to a challenge to their regulatory autonomy.  The 




It is evident from this discussion that football represents a product market with very 
distinctive features, but nevertheless some central economic concepts are useful as a 
device for interrogating data and undertaking analysis.   It has also been shown that 
football has generated both a politics of cooption and engagement by boards and of 
resistance by fans. 
     Given the distinctiveness of football, it might be asked whether it is appropriate to 
apply general theories of political economy.   The argument made here is that they have 
to be applied, both to give intellectual credulity to the enterprise and, hopefully, to make 
some contribution to the ongoing theoretical debate about political economy (although 
important issues about structure and agency have not been tackled here).   It is also 
enables the identification of the kinds of political-economic themes and problems that 
any future debates would need to address.   It is suggested that the political contribution 
to a model of the political economy of football comes from four main elements: 
• The strength of the policy community within football which uses arguments about 
expertise acquired by experience and the need for football to resolve its own 
problems to resist exogenous pressures. 
• Faced with such resistance, the temptation for governments is to resort to a 
depoliticisation strategy which involves indirect management of football related 
issues. 
• Consequently, the penetration of the regulatory state remains more limited in 
football than in other economic and social arenas with self-regulation remaining 
an important theme. 
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• The use of football to promote social policy objectives creates a politics of 
engagement that is available as an option to clubs and that receives more political 
underpinning from the core executive than any politics of resistance by 
supporters. 
The value of this model is that it allows one to identify possible areas in which  
changes in the balance of power between the different actors could be sought.   One has 
to wary of falling into a kind of (politically popular) market failure logic in which an 
economic analysis is qualified by a consideration of political forces seen as a means of 
remedying market shortcomings.    Nevertheless, this is a point at which one can integrate 
the economic and the political analysis.   ‘The case for regulation to over-ride the “free 
market” outcome … seems enhanced if clubs are pursuing non-profit rather than profit 
objectives.’   (Dobson and Goddard, 2001, 9).   One can also apply analysis of monopoly 
as a form of market failure as a theoretical underpinning for football regulation: 
      The basis of this is that football clubs occupy a local monopoly position given the 
      peculiar nature of consumption in the football industry.   Put simply, the argument 
      is that football fans are not customers in the normal sense, but that their custom is 
      based on loyalty to a particular club which will remain unchanged whatever the 
      success of the team and regardless of relative prices across clubs.   (Brown, 2000, 
      256) 
     One controversial conclusion that could be drawn is that football needs more (and 
more sophisticated) politics not less to counter the strength of economic forces and to 
ensure that the game is treated as more than a marketable commodity.   Depoliticisation 
does not mean an absence of politics, but it does involve a more arms length strategy for 
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managing potentially difficult issues as far as government is concerned.   One way to 
bring about change in the mutually reinforcing model outlined above would be for 
football to be politicised and that implies more active and systematic state intervention 
than has occurred hitherto.   Given a general preference for depoliticisation where 
possible, and a desire to avoid government overload, this may not occur.  Government’s 
preference in relation to football has been to devolve policy tasks to lower levels where 
achievement can be measured by performance targets rather than to intervene in the 
management of the game as a business.   Football thus enters into a partnership with the 
state to develop policies that seek to fulfil goals such as more healthy lifestyles.   This 
helps to boost football’s image and helps government to try and achieve some of its goals 
without disturbing the involvement of international business corporations or big business 
interests (although tax policy is always a potential source of tension).   
       In practical terms, politicising football and engaging the state in its affairs in a more 
systematic way is a difficult project given the lack of understanding of politics, properly 
conceived, within football and its tendency to think itself of a separate world which 
should be protected from external interference.   General encouragement for supporters’ 
trusts or exhortations to football to put its house in order will not address some of the 
dilemmas outlined in this article.   In intellectual terms, however, this article has sought 
to develop a political economy model that permits a better understanding of the balance 
of economic and political forces involved and the way in which the specific 
characteristics of the football market justify regulatory intervention. 
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